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SUPPLEMENT 5
TO
JOINT EVALUATION OF
SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA

PREPARED BY

Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
National Photographic Interpretation Center

2200 HOURS

24 OCTOBER 1962

This report is based on relatively complete photo interpretation of U-2 photography made on:

14 October 1962 Mission 3101
15 October 1962 Missions 3102 & 3103
17 October 1962 Missions 3104, 3105, 3106,
3107, 3108, & 3109
18 October 1962 Mission 3111
19 October 1962 Mission 3113 & 3114
20 October 1962 Mission 3115, 3116 & 3117
22 October 1962 Mission 3118 & 3119
and on relatively complete photo interpretation of low-level
photography of Missions 5001 through 5006 of 23 October 1962.

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NOTICE

This supplement updates and amplifies previous reports. Emphasis continues to be placed on the READINESS status, or changes therein, of the offensive missiles in Cuba. This report is based on photographic coverage through Mission 5005 of Tuesday, 23 October 1962 (see Figure 1). The quality of the recent, low-altitude photography permits positive identification of many types of missile associated equipment.

SUMMARY

1. As yet there is no evidence of change in the pace of construction activities.
2. There are no changes in the estimated dates of operational capability for the MRBM and IRBM sites (see Figure 2).
3. No additional missiles, missile transporters, or erectors have been identified (see Table 1).
4. No new missile sites have been identified.
5. No IRBMs per se have yet been identified. [REDACTED] E
6. There is increasing evidence of the use of camouflage at several sites.
7. Three of the Soviet ships suspected of being possible ballistic missile carriers enroute to Cuba are reportedly altering their course.

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8. We have analyzed the capability of the Soviets to transport nuclear warheads for these missiles from the USSR to Cuba using submarines and aircraft. While submarine transport is possible, air transport is more likely. A TU-114 can fly non-stop from Olenya in the Soviet Union to Cuba with up to 10 nuclear warheads on an approximate great circle route which would not pass over any other country.

9. New, low-altitude photography of 23 October confirms previous estimates of the general characteristics and rate of construction of the probable nuclear warhead bunkers at several sites. We are at this time unable to determine whether these bunkers are for storage or checkout of nuclear warheads, or for both of these functions.

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